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RECENT CASES
questions on a case by case basis, the refusal of the Court to deny the applica-
bility of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states, and
the dissents lodged in Williams v. Oklahoma,44 Ciucci v. Illinois,4 5 and Chichos
v. State46 indicate that the United States Supreme Court, when confronted
with this issue, will decide in *accord with the prediction made by the New
York Court of Appeals in the instant case.
JEFFREY SELLERS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MnRANnA: THE APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION TO CONFESSIONS-A
CHANGE IN APPROACH.
Ernesto Miranda was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping and raping
an eighteen year old girl. After being identified by the victim, he was escorted
to a special interrogation room to be questioned by police officers. Miranda was
not advised of his right to have an attorney present, nor made aware of his
privilege against self-incrimination. Though at first denying his guilt, within
two hours Miranda gave a detailed confession, admitting and describing the
crime. At his trial before a jury, the confession was admitted into evidence
over the objection of defense counsel. Subsequently, Miranda was found guilty
as charged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the conviction,
holding that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining
the confession.' The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed
the conviction. Held, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpa-
tory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation2 of the defendant,
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards which effectively pro-
tect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Unless equally effective
safeguards are adopted, the following procedures must be employed: prior to any
questioning, thie person must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything said can and will
be used against him in court. He must be clearly informed that he has the
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during the in-
terrogation. Also, it is necessary to inform him that if he is indigent, a lawyer
will be appointed to represent him. If the individual indicates in any manner,
at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. Similarly, the opportunity to exercise his right
44. 358 U.S. 576, 587 (1959).
45. 356 U.S. 571, 573 (1958).
46. 35 U.S.L. Week 4003, 4004 (Nov. 14, 1966).
1. State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965).
2. Custodial interrogation is defined by the Court as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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to assistance of counsel must be afforded him throughout the interrogation.
The defendant may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. The fact that he may have voluntarily consented
to answer some questions does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned. If the interrogation continues without
the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests
on the prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona (consolidated in a single
opinion with three companion cases, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United
States and California v. Stewart), 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The privilege against self-incrimination, incorporated in the Federal Bill
of Rights,3 and the constitutions of forty-eight states,4 including New York,0
guarantees the freedom of an individual from testimonial compulsion. Histori-
cally, the privilege originated in England during the reign of Charles I (1625-
1649) .6 The English government made great use of special prerogative courts:
the Court of High Commission, which investigated and prosecuted religious
subversion; and the Court of Star Chamber, which specialized in political
subversives 7 Both courts made use of a device known as an "ex officio oath" by
which the accused was compelled to give self-incriminatory testimony.8 This oath
became a powerful and hated weapon of persecution.9 As a result, Parliament
abolished both the "oath" and the prerogative courts by statute in 1641.10 The
principle thereby established-that a person could not be compelled by oath
to incriminate himself-won recognition in the common law courts, so that be-
fore the middle of the eighteenth century, the privilege was firmly established in
English law." Similarly, and in light of the English experience, the privilege
had a place in American law from earliest colonial days, having been incor-
porated into the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 and the Connecticut
Code of 1650.12 The practices of the prerogative courts of the Royal Governors
3. "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. V, § 2.
4. Iowa and New Jersey are the only states whose constitutions do not embody the
privilege against self-incrimination. Iowa has held the privilege to be required by constitu-
tional due process. Amana Soc'y v. Seizer, 250 Iowa 380, 383, 94 N.W.2d 337, 339 (1959).
New Jersey grants the privilege by statute. NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2A:84A-17 (Supp. 1963).
5. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6, using language similar to the fifth amendment, supra note
3; see also N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 10.
6. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961); for other historical exposi-
tions of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construe-
tion of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930); Pittman, The Colonial
and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L.
Rev. 763 (1935); Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955); Fellman, The Defendant's
Rights (1958).
7. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. 16 Car. I, cc. 10, 11 (1641).
11. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2250, nn.71-72.
12. Fellman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 155.
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and Councils solidified opinion on the subject, and ultimately led to the
adoption of the privilege against self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights of
the federal constitution. 3 At common law, the privilege did not apply where
there was no official right to compel answers, and hence, did not apply to
confessions elicited by police interrogation. 14 This limitation led to a parallel
but distinct development of protections in the area of police-secured con-
fessions, namely, that coerced confessions are inadmissible as evidence.15 The
earliest confession cases in the United States Supreme Court emerged from
federal prosecutions and were settled on a non-constitutional basis. The Court
adopted the common law rule that absent inducement, promises or threats
a confession was voluntary and admissible.' 6 However, starting in 1936 with
Brown v. Mississippi,17 the Supreme Court has been determining the admissi-
bility of confessions on the constitutional basis that the interrogation at which
a confession is obtained is part of the process by which a state procures a
conviction, and therefore, is subject to the requirements of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The constitutional test of voluntariness has
become, whether the totality of circumstances deprived the defendant of a
"free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer . . . "18 and whether the
physical and psychological coercion was of such a degree that "the defendant's
will was overborne at the time he confessed . . . ."1 Being incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment, these standards were made applicable to the states.
Unlike the confession rules, the federal privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has not, until recently, been applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 20 New York was, therefore, free
to develop its own standards in applying the privilege to police-elicited con-
fessions. Traditionally, New York courts have held that the privilege does not
apply to police interrogations, and accordingly the police were under no obliga-
tion to warn the accused that he need not answer any questions.2 ' However, in
recent years, the Court of Appeals has been extending the privilege in two
separate situations: police interrogations after formal judicial proceedings
have begun, and to some degree, to police interrogations prior to the institu-
13. Pittman, supra note 6, at 783.
14. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6.
15. Ibid.
16. Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
17. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
18. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
19. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963). For a complete discussion of the
development and application of the confession rules, see Developments in the Law-Con-
tessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935 (1966).
20. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), overruled Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) and Twining v. New Jeresy, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), thereby making the
privilege applicable to the states.
21. People v. Dusablon, 16 N.Y.2d 9, 209 N.E.2d 90, 261 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1965); People
v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E. 553 (1951); People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E.
112 (1909).
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tion of judicial proceedings. These extensions have come about, in large part,
as an incident of the extension of the constitutional right to counsel.
In People v. DiBiasi,2 2 the Court of Appeals considered the question of
whether the defendant's post-indictment confession was admissible in evidence.
The Court took the position that after indictment, the right of the accused to
assistance of counsel is absolute, and any confession secured without such assis-
tance amounts to testimonial compulsion. People v. Waterman23 broadened
this protection to a confession elicited by the police during the period between
the return of a "John Doe" indictment and the arraignment. The Court con-
cluded that there was no difference between an indictment naming the defendant
and one in which his name was later inserted. In holding the defendant's con-
fession inadmissible because it violated his constitutionally protected right to
counsel, the Court of Appeals stated, the state "may not circumvent the de-
fendant's privilege against self-incrimination by introducing . . . statements
obtained from him [following indictment] ... where ... he was not first advised
of his privilege and his right to assistance of counsel." 24 People v. Meyer2 5 ex-
tended the protection of the right to counsel to post-arraignment questioning
prior to formal indictment.20 However, People v. Bodie2 7 restricted these doc-
trinal extensions by holding that the accused may waive his constitutional rights.
Professor Paulsen summarizes these and other New York cases as holding that
"a statement or confession taken from an accused after the formal opening
of a criminal action against him (whether by indictment, information or a
judicial decision holding him for grand jury action), may not be used against
him," unless the accused has been made aware of his right to remain silent, and
of his right to an attorney, and has effectively waived them.
28
However, New York has not been as liberal when the confession occurs
prior to the institution of formal criminal proceedings. In such a situation,
the affirmative duty to warn the accused of his constitutional rights has been
held less than absolute, and arises only after the accused requests counsel20
or when the accused's attorney has requested access to his client. In People v.
Donovan,3 0 the defendant was arrested and taken to a police station for inter-
rogation. While there, his retained counsel requested to see him. The police
22. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
23. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
24. Id. at 566, 175 N.E.2d at 448, 216 N.YS.2d at 75.
25. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
26. The Appellate Division has held that a confession obtained from a suspect prior
to arraignment is inadmissible where the arraignment is delayed in order to secure the con-
fession. People v. Richardson, 25 A.D.2d 221, 268 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1966); People v.
Veitch, 26 A.D.2d 764, 271 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep't 1966). This rule is similar to the
Mallory-McNabb rule in the federal courts. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
27. 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213 N.E.2d 444, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965).
28. Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Criminal Procedure in New York: 1941-1965, 15
Buffalo L. Rev. 304 (1965).
29. People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 175 N.E.2d 451, 216 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1961).
30, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
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refused and the defendant subsequently confessed. The Court of Appeals, in
holding this confession inadmissible, on the grounds that it constituted a denial
of his constitutionally protected right to counsel, stated, "In this case [the right
to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination] converge, for one of the
most important protections which counsel can confer while his client is being
detained by the authorities, is to preserve his client's privilege against self-
incrimination." 3' People v. Failla3 2 extended Donovan to a situation in which
the confession was recorded in part, before the time the defendant's lawyer
had made contact with the police. The Court felt that to fragment the confession
would only lead to confusion and uncertainty in the admissibility of evidence.
It was at this point that Malloy v. Hoganss incorporated the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, thereby making the federal privilege applicable to the
states. The first opportunity for New York and the other states to follow the
federal standard in applying the privilege to police secured confessions came
about as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.34 Danny
Escobedo confessed to the murder of his brother-in-law. This confession occurred
after the police had denied Escobedo's request to consult with his attorney.
Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority of the Court, concluded:
We hold, therefore, that where as here, the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out the process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, the suspect has requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
warned him of his absolute right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied "Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the 6th Amend-
ment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the states by the
14th Amendment", Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. at 342, 83 S. Ct.
at 795, and that no statement elicited by the police during the interro-
gation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
35
This decision became the subject of "judicial interpretation and spirited legal
debate."3 6 State courts, in considering its implications, arrived at varying
conclusions. California, as a result of People v. Dorado,37 represented the
broad interpretation of Escobedo: that is, prior to any interrogation, the police
are under an affirmative duty to warn the accused of his privilege against self-
incrimination and of his right to assistance of counsel, regardless of whether
the accused has requested an attorney. In the absence of such warnings, any
confessions elicited by the police will be inadmissible as evidence. New York,
31. Id. at 151, 152, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
32. 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964).
33. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
34. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
35. Id. at 490, 491 (Emphasis added.).
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966).
37. 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
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on the other hand, interpreted Escobedo narrowly, as meaning that defendant's
constitutional rights arise only upon his affirmative invocation of them. In
People v. Gunner23 the defendant did not request an attorney prior to his
confession. The Court of Appeals stated the defendant's argument:
Relying on People v. Dorado . . . and ... Escobedo v. Illinois . . . ,
the defendant contends that the statements obtained by the police,
in the absence of counsel, after his arrest should be held inadmissible,
even though he never requested a lawyer, . . . since he was then the
prime suspect .... At such point, the defendant argues, he became
entitled to the aid of counsel and accordingly, it was incumbent upon
the police to advise him of his right to refrain from answering any
questions and also of his right to a lawyer.
39
The Court, with Judges Fuld and Desmond dissenting, found this argument
without merit and held that the rules previously announced in its decisions"
0
should not be extended to render inadmissible inculpatory statements obtained
by the police from a person who, taken into custody prior to his arraignment or
indictment, is not made aware of his privilege to remain silent and of his
right to a lawyer. Miranda has made this extension for the Court of Appeals,
thereby giving New York a comprehensive system of protection for the accused
both prior and subsequent to the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. This
extension is based exclusively on the privilege against self-incrimination with
the right to counsel attached merely as a protective device for the privilege,
absent other equally effective procedural safeguards.
Chief Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the Court, explained that
certiorari was granted in order to explore facets of the problems raised by Esco-
bedo v. Illinois of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to custo-
dial interrogation, and to provide concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement agencies and courts to follow.41 The Court was not concerned with
whether Miranda's confession was voluntary in traditional terms,42 but rather
concerned itself primarily with the interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can
bring.4 3 The Chief Justice started with the proposition that the modern practice
of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented, but
that coercion can be mental as well as physical. 44 To demonstrate this, the
Court analyzed interrogation methods as outlined in Inbau and Reid, Criminal
Interrogation and Confession (1963) and O'Hara, Fundamentals in Criminal
Interrogation (1961), which are used extensively by law enforcement agencies
themselves as guides to effective interrogation. From this study, the Court de-
scribed the nature and evils of modem police interrogation techniques:
38. 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
39. Id. at 232, 205 N.E.2d at 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
40. The Court referred to Failla, Donovan, Meyer, Noble, Waterman, and DiBiasi.
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441, 442 (1966).
42. Id. at 457.
43. Id. at 456.
44. Id. at 448.
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To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to
deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his
guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived
story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at
times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the
interrogator must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a
position from which the desired object can be obtained." When normal
procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to
deceptive strategems such as giving false legal advice. It is important
to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his in-
security about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade,
trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights.45
The Court deemed such a process inherently compulsive, and therefore at
odds with the fundamental principle that the individual may not be compelled
to incriminate himself.4 6 Turning to the history of the privilege, and its prece-
dents, namely Brain v. United States,47 and Escobedo v. Illinois,48 the Court
concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination is fully applicable to
police interrogations. 49 In order to protect the privilege so applied, the accused
must be adequately and effectively warned of his constitutional rights, and the
rights must be fully honored. The Supreme Court explained that its decision was
not intended to create a constitutional "straightjacket" which would handicap
future efforts of reform.50 The Court encouraged Congress and the states to
continue their search for effective means of protecting the rights of the accused,
but warned that any procedure thereby adopted must be equally effective
as those promulgated by the Court.5 '
The Court also maintained that its decision was not intended to, nor should
it, have the effect of hampering the traditional functions of police officers in
investigating crime. 52 In this context, the Court answered the traditional argu-
ment that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege against self-
incrimination. 53 The majority maintained that the limits placed on the interro-
gation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system
45. Id. at 455.
46. Id. at 457, 458.
47. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). In Brain the Court held that confession cases are controlled
by the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. justice Harlan, dissenting, was
critical of the majority for relying on Brain since the case has not been generally followed
and its historical premises were disproved by Wigmore; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
506 n.2 (1966).
48. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Harlan maintained that Escobedo contained no reasoning or
even general conclusions addressed to the fifth amendment but rather was based on the
sixth amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 512 n.9 (1966). He argued that the
Court's reliance on Escobedo and other sixth amendment cases demonstrated "the domino
method of constitutional adjudication ... wherein every explanatory statement in a previous
opinion was made the basis for extension to a wholly different situation." Id. at 514.
49. Id. at 467.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 477.
53. Id. at 479, 491.
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of law enforcement. 4 The Court argued that the dangers to law-enforcement
through curbs on interrogation are greatly "overplayed."'' 5 As evidence, the
Court discussed the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has maintained
effective law enforcement while following primarily the safeguards which the
Supreme Court established.5 Also, the Court relied on the experience of other
countries, England,57 Scotland, 8 India,5 9 and Ceylon 0 to further negate the
argument of danger to law enforcement.
Justice White, dissenting, maintained that the rules announced by majority
will measurably weaken the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. He char-
acterized the Court's decision as a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogation
and to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty. 1 As such, the
decision could have no other than a corrosive effect on the criminal law as an
effective device to prevent crime. 2 Maintaining that the Court's rules will
return killers, rapists and other criminals to the streets to repeat their crimes
whenever it pleases them, White refused to share any responsibility in the
Court's decision.
03
Since Miranda extends the right to counsel in terms of a protective device
for the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the significant
question arises as to whether the sixth amendment, under the Escobedo rationale,
has any applicability as an independent basis for a right to counsel in the police
station. Consider in this regard Note 35 in the majority opinion,0 4 stating
that if the police prevent an attorney from consulting with his client,
such action, independent of any other constitutional proscription, constitutes
a violation of the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel, citing the
New York case of People v. Donovan. 5 Does the Court mean that even if the
police have no intention of subjecting the accused to the process of custodial
interrogation, and therefore, there is no need for fifth amendment protective
devices, the police must nevertheless honor an attorney's request to consult
with his client? The need to protect the suspect by enforcing the limitations
on certain police investigatory procedures 0 would argue for the independent
right to counsel in the police station. This argument is strengthened by the fact
that the pre-interrogation investigatory process may constitute the "critical
54. Id. at 481.
55. Id. at 486.
56. Id. at 483, 486. Harlan contended that the F.B.I. procedures fall sensibly short of
the Court's formalistic rules. Id. at 521.
57. Id. at 486-488.
58. Id. at 488.
59. Id. at 488, 489.
60. Id. at 489. Harlan maintained that the laws of these foreign countries are not
comparable to the Miranda rules in that they reflect a more moderate conception of the
rights of the accused as against those of society. Id. at 521-22.
61. Id. at 541.
62. Id. at 543.
63. Id. at 542.
64. Id. at 465.
65. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
66. E.g., lineups and bloodtests. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
446
RECENT CASES
stage" in the criminal prosecution of the accused, on the grounds that the physi-
cal evidence thereby secured may be sufficient, in itself, to sustain a conviction.
17
However, the Court's interpretation of Escobedo, and its insistence that the
adversary system commences only "when the individual is first subjected to
police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any way,"68 implies that the sixth amendment has
no applicability beyond the interrogation process.69 It is doubtful whether
New York, under Donovan and Gunner, has gone beyond the Supreme Court
in this regard, since these cases extend the right to counsel only in an interroga-
tion context. Thus, it would seem that neither New York nor the United States
Supreme Court now provides for the right to counsel if the police do not in-
terrogate the accused.
Note 35 may mean, therefore, that once custodial interrogation is com-
menced (i.e., once the adversary system begins) the independent right to
counsel arises. The result might possibly be that even though a suspect has
been warned of his constitutional rights, and insists oh talking, the resulting
confession will be inadmissible if his attorney has been denied access to him at
any point during the questioning. Such an interpretation is conceptually con-
sistent with the holding in the instant case, that after waiver the accused can
still invoke his privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer any
further questions. This must mean that the privilege has continuing applicability
during all stages of the interrogation process, regardless of waiver. Accordingly,
the privileges' protective device, the right to counsel, also has continuing ap-
plicability; therefore, any police refusal of an attorney's request to consult with
the suspect constitutes a violation of the suspect's constitutional rights.
Another possible explanation of Note 35 is that the Court has provided
the right to counsel, independent of its use as a protective device for the
privilege against self-incrimination, so as to provide a suspect with an at-
torney in the event that the states, following the invitation of the Court,
70
adopt fifth amendment protective devices other than the right to counsel (e.g.,
magistrates or other court officers present during interrogation). A magistrate's
presence would constitute the requisite protective device for the privilege,
thereby relieving the police of the obligation to provide the accused with
counsel. However, the need for an attorney in such circumstances is clear.
The presence of a magistrate will only insure that the police do not compel
or coerce the accused to involuntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. It will not provide the suspect with the strategic advice necessary during
67. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961).
68. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
69. For a discussion of the same problem, where the author comes to a different
conclusion, see Schwartz, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 766, 767 n.243 (1966).
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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any police interrogation. Footnote 35 guarantees the accused this advice by
providing him with the right to counsel in such circumstances.
It should be noted that while New York already provides for this inde-
pendent right to counsel, under the Donovan and Gunner decisions, the right is
severely limited to only those defendants who have either retained or requested
counsel. However there would seem to be little reason in a society like ours to
require a man to request those rights guaranteed him by the Constitution.1
Moreover, such a concept was expressly condemned in Miranda when the right
to counsel is used as a protective device for the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, on the grounds that the requirement of request discriminates against those
defendants who are not aware of their constitutional rights3
2
Miranda also provides no guidance in answering such questions as whether
statements made by the accused were spontaneous or the product of interrogation,
whether non-testimonial evidence introduced at trial is the fruit of statements
made during a prohibited interrogation, and also, what constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty .so as to require the Miranda warnings. This last
question is of special importance to New York in light of its "Stop and Frisk"78
statute which expressly permits the police "to stop any person abroad in a
public place ... and ... demand of him his name, address, and an explanation
of his actions. ' 'r4 The state police have been officially advised that Miranda
does not require them to warn suspects, detained under this statute, of their
constitutional rights.7 5 However this issue must ultimately be decided by the
United States Supreme Court on the basis of whether a person so detained "has
been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
GARY M. COHEN
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS-INcoRPORATION BY REF-
ERENCE-CONDITIONAL BEQUEST RENDERED ABSOLUTE BY INADMISSABILITY Or
CONTRARY DIRECTIONS
Testator bequeathed his clothing, jewelry, the remainder of his paintings,
and similar personal effects "to be distributed as I shall direct in a memorandum
to be found with this will or in my safe deposit box now at the First National
City Bank of New York... or in my office safe, or in the absence of such direc-
tions, to be distributed by my said wife or niece as she shall deem proper."1
71. Note, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 719, 721 (1966).
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470, 471 (1966). See also People v. Dorado,
62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965). Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
73. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 180-a.
74. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 180-a(1).
75. McKane, Comments on Miranda v. Arizona, 1 Law Enforcement Executive (No.
2) p. 7 (1966).
1. Matter of Salmon, 24 A.D.2d 962, 265 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (1st Dep't 1965).
